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Abstract 
How robust is the evidence that microcredit works? Theory on microfinance initiatives has moved far ahead of 
evidence, and success stories remain unsubstantiated. Lack of convergence in findings together with the contexts 
in which impact studies have been conducted, render the interpretation and generalization of findings intricate. 
Consequently, thirty years into the growth of microfinance industry there is scant evidence that microfinance 
improves the lives of clients in measurable ways. This paper reviews methodological and data constraints in 
microfinance impact assessments. The study builds on earlier work and considers recent research on 
microfinance initiatives in order to isolate some emerging contestable issues.  
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance has been regarded as an effective policy tool in the fight against poverty. Yet there is so far no 
consensus among researchers on the impact of microcredit. To date the emphasis has been on potential positive 
linkages. But why does reality look so different?  Quite often we observe outcomes for households with 
microfinance, but not outcomes for the same households without microfinance at the same moment in time. In 
spite of the abundance of theoretical literature, there has been surprisingly little concrete and rigorous evidence 
on whether and how microfinance actually helps to reduce poverty. Theory has moved far ahead of evidence, 
and success stories remain unsubstantiated. The relatively few carefully conducted cross-sectional or 
longitudinal impact studies remain anecdotes (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010).  
Evaluation of the impact of microfinance requires disentangling the simultaneous roles of income, location 
and entrepreneurial attributes. Most of the studies fail to control for endogeneity which leads to overestimating 
or underestimating the interventions. This reflects the difficulty of distinguishing the causal effect of microcredit 
from selection effects. To identify causal effects, researchers have to find ways to approximate the prediction of 
what would have happened without the microfinance intervention. The impact of microfinance initiatives 
therefore remain highly contestable (Muriu, Murinde and Mullineux, 2017). Previous studies have either 
overlooked or are unable to resolve the overarching issue of data and methodological challenges. Given such 
hurdles to overcome, the evidence generated by microfinance studies is contestable. This paper seeks to address 
these weaknesses by reviewing data and various methodologies employed in the evaluation of microfinance 
impact while at the same time underscoring the need for more rigorous evaluations.  
 
2. Cross sectional studies 
Traditional research in microfinance has relied on cross-sectional data to test theoretically driven hypotheses 
where the dependent, explanatory, and control variables each have a single measure, often at one point in time. 
Cross-sectional data requires the researcher to make strong assumptions about the comparability of different 
observations. OLS regression represents the most popular estimation technique. The main limitation of cross-
sectional studies such as Al-shami, et al (2018), Samer,  et al (2015) Ganle, et al (2015), Mazumder & Lu (2015), 
Ghaliba, et al (2014) is limited effectiveness in tackling the problem of selection & placement bias, attribution, 
and fungibility.  
Selection and placement bias may occur due to; (i) individual participation is usually voluntary. Participants 
differ from non-participants in observable and unobservable ways. The treatment group systematically 
possessing an invisible attribute such as entrepreneurial ability which the control group lacks. Therefore 
receiving any form of intervention may result in a short-term positive response from the treatment group, (ii) 
difficulties in finding a location at which the control groups economic, physical and social environment matches 
that of the treatment group, (iii) the control group becoming contaminated by contact with the treatment group 
and (iv) the fungibility of the treatment (see Hume 2005).  
Selection bias may also go in the opposite direction. Many MFIs target women and poor households. Poorer 
households are likely to be borrowers than their neighbours conditional on village of residence and other 
observable characteristics. In cross sectional studies, this outreach can lead to a downward bias on the estimated 
effect of credit on earnings (Morduch 1999). At the extreme, the effective targeting of poor households can yield 
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the impression that participation in the program makes clients poorer. Addressing selection bias reveals how 
participation increases earnings. For instance, Karlan  (2007) and Ahlin and Townsend (2007a),  show that not 
controlling for selection bias can lead to over estimation of the effect of participation on MFIs profit by as much 
as 100%. 
Difference-in-differences (DID) approach controls for self-selection and non-random program placement 
bias due to variables that do not change over time. A major identifying assumption in difference in difference 
estimation is that there are no time-varying, unit-specific shocks to the outcome variable that are correlated with 
treatment status, and that selection into treatment is independent of temporary individual-specific effect.  DID 
requires data collection both for control and treatment groups before and after intervention. DID estimates can 
control for fixed differences between clients and non-clients. But this only holds if the impact of the measured, 
unmeasured, and village attributes do not change over time, otherwise OLS estimates would be biased.  
With DID approach, the time invariant unmeasured attributes drop out. But the unmeasured attribute may 
change over time which may amplify the selection/endogeneity problem. Although selection bias associated with 
fixed characteristics can be eliminated by DID approach, selection bias associated with growth prospects remain 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010). It might also be the case that people who choose to join MFIs would be on 
different trajectories. This invalidates comparisons over time between clients and non-clients (see e.g Tedeschi 
and Karlan 2013). The typical response to the problem is to estimate impacts while including region-level fixed 
effects or their equivalent (see e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
Another source of bias is non-random program placement since most social interventions are targeted 
(Karlan 2007; Armendáriz and Morduch 2010). Upward biases arise when programs choose regions that are 
already doing well, and downward biases arise when programs favour disadvantaged areas. Many programs are 
set up specifically to serve the underserved. Thus, they are located in areas previously with weak financial 
services. This may lead to apparent negative impacts relative to control areas. Alternatively the programs may 
set up where there is good complementary infrastructure biasing estimates upwards. The pioneering theoretical 
work by Copestake (2007), shows that wealthier clients cost less. The signs and size of the biases are likely to 
change as programs expand over time into new areas. Including region-level fixed effects can exacerbate bias 
when program placement is predicated on unobserved qualities particular to target populations. Data suggest that 
this is often the case. But, with the exception of the results on reduced variability, the main qualitative results are 
robust both with and without controls for village-level unobservables (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  
One of the least understood phenomenon when examining the impacts of microfinance using cross-sectional 
data is the high dropout rates also known as survivorship bias. Borrowers leave either because they are doing so 
well or they are in trouble (Tedeschi and Karlan (2013). It is likely that those who remain behind have the 
positive qualities of survivors, while the new borrowers are yet to be tested. If better off clients are more likely to 
leave, the pool of borrowers becomes poorer on average and when the poor leaves, impacts are overstated. If the 
failures are more likely to drop out, comparing old to new borrowers will overestimate impacts. Since some 
borrowers drop out of the program, the treatment group is incomplete. Another problem is due to non random 
exclusion (Pearlman, 2014).  
The issue of fungibility of credit is a critical problem in precisely determining the impact of credit. Credit is 
often not used as originally indicated to the lender. Failure to control for fungibility may over-estimate the 
impacts of micro credit intervention. This is particularly true when households have access to multiple sources of 
credit (Khalily, 2004).  The other limitation with pure cross-section data is historical context. 
 
3. Longitudinal studies 
Some microfinance studies have also used panel data to test static propositions. The novelty of panel data models 
is their power to overcome the problems of endogeneity bias, in addition to controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity across households. Baltagi (2020) highlights several advantages of panel data compared with 
cross-sectional data.  
 
Although panel data offers a number of advantages, the analysis of the same requires the adoption of a 
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number of assumptions and trade-offs. The use of panel data often creates potential statistical problems for OLS 
regression. Specifically, panel data may create analytic problems in the form of error terms containing 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, or contemporaneous correlation; the presence of such conditions creates non 
spherical error terms. Analyzing panel data without panel-level error terms assumes that MFIs are homogeneous. 
Beck and Katz (1995), highlight the benefits of panel-corrected standard errors to control for such analytic 
problems. Contemporaneous correlations arise when the errors of unit i at time t are correlated with errors of unit 
j at time t. This correlation violates the assumption of spherical error terms and could influence the results of 
OLS.  
Contemporaneous correlation could be particularly harmful in microfinance research. Events occurring in 
the external environment may increase uncertainty and outcomes for a number of MFIs in a sample. To account 
for the influence of contemporaneous correlation, researchers have employed techniques such as Generalized 
Least Square (GLS) estimation. For GLS to model contemporaneous correlation, the number of time periods, T, 
in a panel data must exceed the number of units, N; this requirement is a necessary condition. To the extent that 
these problems are present and not corrected, the analysis of panel data may actually produce incorrect 
estimation results (Baltagi, 2020).   
Certo and Semadeni (2006) conducted two studies to examine the potential influence of contemporaneous 
correlation. They used Monte Carlo simulations to analyze the extent to which contemporaneous correlation 
influences the results of other estimators such as fixed and random effects regression. By extending Beck and 
Katz’s (1995), they examined the behaviour and performance of different estimators in data sets where the 
number of units exceeds the number of time periods (i.e., N>T). They were quick to point that when 
contemporaneous correlation interferes with estimator accuracy, estimators may yield results that support (or 
reject) a theory when the results are, in fact, driven by contemporaneous correlation. 
From a theoretical standpoint, researchers must carefully choose between fixed-effects and random-effects 
regression when analyzing panel data and use relevant tests to examine whether modelling heterogeneity 
improves model fit. For example, researchers examining panel data could estimate a model with OLS (Model 1) 
and then estimate another model with fixed effects (Model 2). A Chow test would enable the researcher to 
determine whether the inclusion of fixed effects in Model 2 improves the fit compared to Model 1. Choosing 
between fixed and random effects models remains difficult as each technique has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. It would be unrealistic to expect that the panel-level error term exerts a constant influence over 
time with fixed-effects models. The issue of covariates that do not vary over time may also inform the choice 
between fixed and random effects models.  
It is important to note, that just like in DID models, fixed effects models implicitly allow researchers to 
control for all variables that do not vary over time. The key difference between the two techniques is that random 
effects models are able to report coefficients for these variables, whereas fixed-effects models do not (see Baltagi 
2020). The choice between fixed and random effect models also depends on statistical assumptions underlying 
the models. Random effects models assume that the estimated panel error term is uncorrelated with the 
independent variables. The Hausman test helps in evaluating this condition. The Hausman test will reject models 
if this assumption does not hold. When the Hausman test is rejected, researchers should rely on fixed-effects 
models, which are not restricted by this assumption (Wooldridge 2002). It is also important for researchers to 
understand that GLS estimation does not account for unit heterogeneity. 
In microfinance studies, fixed effects estimation does not control for lending mechanism features such as 
peer networks or other relevant characteristics that are specific to households in program villages. The village 
level fixed effects will only control for those unobservables that affect all households in a village-identically and 
linearly (Hsiao, 2003). While it is common to use fixed effects estimators to control for unobservable variables 
correlated with the placement of programs, using fixed effects estimators can exacerbate biases when dealing 
with targeted populations. It is for this reason that Morduch (1999) contested Pitt and Khandker (1998),  findings 
since poorer households are more likely to be Grameen borrowers than their neighbours, conditional on village 
of residence and other observable characteristics which can lead to a downward bias on estimated effect of 
microcredit.  
A variant of panel data estimation includes pooled regression model which assumes that any two country-
years can be compared, whether across time or across space. Although Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch 
(2007), pioneered the use of cross-country, cross-MFI data in statistical tests and provided a new dimension to 
the existing literature on MFIs performance, pooled regression model omits fixed effects, and omitting fixed 
effects risks omitted variables bias. Pooled regression estimates just a single intercept rather than different 
intercepts for each unit and/or time point. The omitted country-specific intercepts may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Additionally the disturbances may be correlated within groups.   
Lensink et al (2018) employ panel data modelling to examine the potential effects of microfinance ‘plus’ on 
the financial and social performance of MFIs.  Khandker et al (2016) used long panel household survey data to 
investigate various dimensions of microcredit effects on a set of behaviours. Muriu (2012), Ahlin et al (2011) 
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also estimates a baseline specification on a sample of MFIs. To the extent that there is likely to be persistence in 
the MFI outcome variables (see e.g Muriu, 2016), endogeneity remains an issue with these and other similar 
empirical studies in microfinance.  
Fixed/Random Effects estimator (within) model in the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors is both biased and inconsistent. Dynamic panel-data models include p lags of the dependent variable 
as covariates and contain unobserved panel-level effects, fixed or random. Therefore and by construction, the 
unobserved fixed or random effects are correlated with the lagged dependent variables, making standard 
estimators inconsistent (Baltagi, 2020). Ideally, these panel methods do not control, where possible, for 
endogeneity, measurement error and omitted variables. One prominent way to address these shortcomings has 
been through first-differenced generalized method of moments estimators (GMM) applied to dynamic panel data 
models. The relevant estimator was originally developed by Holtz-Eakin, et al (1988) and refined by Arellano 
and Bond (1991).  
The basic idea of GMM estimator is to specify the regression equation as a dynamic panel data model then 
take first-differences to remove unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects. Further, instrument the right-
hand-side variables in the first-differenced equations using levels of the series lagged two periods or more, under 
the assumption that the time-varying disturbances in the original levels equations are not serially correlated 
(Baltagi 2020). An advantage of the dynamic GMM estimation is that all variables from the regression that are 
not correlated with the error term including lagged and differenced variables can be used as valid instruments 
(Greene, 2008). This is an unexplored dimension in microfinance literature. 
Microfinance endogenous placement problem can be dealt with by using group-level fixed effects. If for 
instance, placement decisions are made on the basis of observable and unobservable characteristics of the region 
or the group, the direct effect based on these characteristics will pass into the fixed effects. Because of the 
inconsistency of fixed-effect probit regressions, linear probability regression-probit, and logit specifications with 
robust standard errors can be utilized since robust standard errors in the linear probability model are substantially 
larger. Panel data modelling however, allows for construction and tests of more complicated behavioural models 
compared to other estimation techniques. The methodology also allows the dynamics of adjustment, 
identification and measurement of effects which would have otherwise not been detectable in the analysis of 
cross section or time series data (Baltagi, 2020).  
 
4. Search for convincing instrumental variables  
An alternative to the difference-in-difference model is the use of instrumental variables (IV), which is close to 
structural econometric method since it relies on exclusion restrictions (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). The IV 
method assumes that some components of the non-experimental data are random. It is perhaps the most widely 
used approach in measuring treatment effects (Islam, 2015). IV seeks to find a variable that is excluded from the 
outcome equation, but which is related to treatment status and has no direct association with the outcome. 
Several empirical studies such as Martinez, (2015), Alam, (2013), Kaboski and Townsend (2005) have utilized 
instrumental variables.  
The search for convincing instrumental variables for credit has yielded little. The weakness of the IV 
approach is that such variables do not often exist, or that unrealistic assumptions must be maintained in order for 
them to be used to identify the treatment effect of interest. The difficulty in identifying instrumental variables  
often arise because many of the characteristics that define MFIs are likely to be endogenous in performance and 
outreach regressions. The problem is further compounded by the fact that variables which may be unrelated may 
be integrally linked due to non-separabilites driven by imperfect and incomplete markets. It then becomes less 
likely that a production side variable that explains credit use does not also help explain expenditure related 
outcomes independently (Morduch 1999, Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  
Interest rate is a potential identifying variable but since achieving uniformity across branches is a common 
goal of microfinance programs, interest rates are very unlikely to vary within a given area and estimation is 
impossible without some variation. Even if interest rates vary, it is likely that the variation will at least partly 
reflect unobserved attributes of the borrower undermining their use as instruments. Pitt and Khandker’s (1998), 
exploited the landholding criterion by using a weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood and regression 
discontinuity design to estimate marginal impacts rather than the average impacts. Their general approach is 
recast as an instrumental variables problem that helps clarify necessary identifying restrictions and illustrates 
broader methodological differences.  
Using the data in Khandker (2003) and similar methodology, Khandker (2005) conducted a specification 
test and concluded that fixed-effects technique was more appropriate than fixed-effects with instrumental 
variables approach. Instrumental variables therefore lead to larger standard errors and less efficient results. 
Roodman and Morduch (2014) replicates Pitt and Khandker (1998), Morduch (1999) and Khandker (2005) 
applied the same methodology to the same data and performed closely related Two-Stage Least-Squares 
regressions which generated results opposite in sign. Their specification tests suggest that the instrumentation 
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strategy fails; that reverse or omitted-variable causation was driving the results, and that the sign and magnitude 
of the endogenous credit-consumption relationship vary by sub-sample, as well as the gender of the borrower. 
This explains the seeming gender differential in impact. Further analysis on these data questions the basis for the 
quasi-experimental identification in Pitt and Khandker (1998), and by extension in Morduch (1999) and show 
how, in Khandker (1998), exploiting the panel dimension does not compensate for the lack of clearly exogenous 
variation in the treatment variable. 
 
5. Natural experiment  
The main goal of microfinance impact assessment is to estimate the effect of an intervention in relationship to 
the counterfactual—what would have happened in the absence of the intervention. A common technique to 
achieve this is to compare program participants to a group of similar non-participants. The difficulty is to find 
groups that are sufficiently comparable. With most impact assessments in microfinance, the major hurdle is that 
the treatment group was self-selected.  
Natural experiments occur when a researcher observes naturally occurring, controlled comparisons of one 
or more treatments with a baseline (Levitt and List 2009). Field experiment has only one source of possible 
selection bias: the decision to be in the naturally occurring market. The main disadvantage of natural 
experiments is that the researcher does not get to pick and choose the specifics of the treatments, and does not 
get to pick where and when the treatments will be imposed (Glenn et al, 2004). The difference between the 
parameter estimates of treatment and control groups is the effect of intervention. However, precision depends on 
the ability to control for observable and unobservable characteristics. 
Quasi-experiments on the other hand seek to compare the outcomes of an intervention with a simulation of 
what the outcomes would have been, had there been no intervention. Estimation techniques include multiple 
regressions, but this has enormous demands for data on other possible causal factors and its assumptions. 
Innovations using structural evaluation of large-scale quasi-experimental initiatives include Bhuiya, et al (2016), 
You & Annim (2014), Nghiem, et al (2012), Kaboski and Townsend (2011). The quasi-experimental design, as 
argued by Habib and Jubb (2015) could be less effective in the absence of finding non-programme villages 
because of the depth of microfinance programs. The situation was partly experienced by Zohir et al (2001) while 
using disaggregated target participants by length of membership as a proxy for non-participant control group.  
 
6. Randomised controlled trials 
In microfinance, randomised controlled trials (RCTs) isolate the effect of a chosen innovation by assigning a 
random selection of individuals or villages to the innovation and another equivalent selection of villages or 
individuals to maintain the status quo and comparing results between the groups. RCTs enable researchers to 
estimate the impact of the intervention, free of the identified bias.  
Methodologies for addressing selection bias can be ordered by their effectiveness at dealing with the 
problem and RCTs have proved better than others. RCTs require fewer assumptions in order to establish 
causality (See Imbens 2010). In randomized experiments, individuals are “assigned” to the treatment and control 
groups, they do not form the groups themselves. The characteristics of the participants are not related to the 
outcome, and the difference in outcomes between borrowers and non-borrowers is therefore only due to the loan.  
RCTs have become increasingly popular in development economics as a way of overcoming many of the 
identification concerns that can arise with non-experimental approaches. Many of the earliest applications were 
in education and health (see, for example, Kremer 2003). Later on microfinance studies gained traction. These 
include Karlan and Zinman (2009, 2010, 2011), Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2010), Kaboski and Townsend (2011), 
Dupas and Robinson (2013). These studies  were able to circumvent the endogeneity problem by making use of 
RCTs, and estimating a difference-in-difference (using pre-post and treatment-control data) model which 
enabled them to rule out the possibility that social connections correlates with other group characteristics in 
influencing repayment. This process of group formation exogenously creates groups with different levels of 
initial social ties, which enables the actual measurement of the impact of these social ties on monitoring and 
enforcement efforts within the group.  
Subsequent rigorous analysis to evaluate the impact of access to microcredit on borrowers and their 
households, that controlled for endogeneity problem were set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Augsburg, et al 
2015), Ethiopia (Tarozzi, et al 2015), India (Banerjee, et al 2015), Mexico (Angelucci, et al 2015), Mongolia 
(Attanasio, et al 2015), Morocco (Crépon, et al 2015) and cross country (Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman 2015). 
Studies that have augmented RCTs with qualitative analysis include Guerin, et al (2014). 
RCTs have been embraced as the panacea for evaluations. But randomization is not always possible, nor 
desirable and designing and implementing randomized experiments is difficult (Banerjee and Duflo 2009; 
Deaton 2009; Imbens 2010). First, the methodology provides an estimate of the average impact of an 
intervention. It does not tell us anything about the median impact, and offers little about the distribution of 
impacts. Second, while RCTs excel at providing a clean estimate of impact, they are by necessity implemented 
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in a particular setting, and may not be generalized to other settings (external validity). For instance, Prina (2015) 
shows that the design of the field experiment with randomization at the household level, rather than at the village 
level, could not allow her to study the general equilibrium effects of giving access to bank accounts to the entire 
sample of households. Similalry, a randomized evaluation of flip charts as teacher’s aide in schools in Kenya 
(Glewwe, et al 2000) only tells us whether the flip charts helped raise test score for the students in Western 
Kenya. It is plausible that students or schools in other parts of Kenya, India, or Latin America have different 
educational needs, and would benefit differently from flip charts. Additionally, can one conclude from a one-
year follow-up that microfinance does not work? 
Another concern with the current trend towards credible causal inference in general, and towards RCTs in 
particular, is that it may lead researchers to avoid questions where randomization is difficult, or even 
conceptually impossible. There are many such questions, and many of them are of great importance. Questions 
such as will digital banking reach the very poor or concerning the causal effects of macro-economic policies on 
microfinance cannot be settled by randomized experiments. In some cases randomized experiments raise ethical 
concerns, and are ultimately not feasible. However, the importance of questions for which randomization is 
difficult or infeasible, should not pre-empt RCTs. Well-implemented randomized experiments provide 
particularly powerful ways to measure impact or improved product design because they guarantee the best 
unbiased estimates.  
Future research on randomized control trials should emphasize on the need for replications in other settings 
before drawing conclusions. Because randomized experiments are carefully planned and implemented, 
expansion to a large scale may yield different results. The best way to overcome external validity is through 
theory and repetition. By testing ideas in sufficient locations, with a variety of contexts, researchers can 
confidently state that a theory holds and can be used to inform policies. It is time microfinance researchers 
started collecting rigorous evidence about what works and why, so that policymakers and practitioners can 
maximize the impact of microfinance programs around the world. Other econometric approaches will continue to 
be valuable in assessing directions of impact and the ensuing relationships between economic and financial 
variables. 
Randomized and non-randomized techniques have different strengths and weaknesses. For example, non-
randomized techniques can opportunistically exploit natural experiments and therefore from a policy perspective 
the optimal research portfolio should blend the two techniques. It is however not clear when non-experimental 
studies are worth undertaking. Therefore when analyzing causality with strong endogeneity, non-experimental 
identification should be rigorous. The evidence adduced so far also casts doubt on the power of sophisticated 
parametric techniques to compensate for the lack of such (Roodman and Morduch 2014).  
 
7. Data challenges in microfinance research 
The main difficulty in microfinance impact studies arising from methodological techniques is partly due to the 
challenges of obtaining reliable data on the working of microfinance programs and for testing concrete 
hypothesis. Data is critical for articulating policy initiatives, but as a relatively youthful industry, microfinance 
data have been slow to accumulate. Researchers use different sources of data to test various hypotheses. 
Different methodological approaches suggest that rigorous impact studies can be increased by basing them on 
reliable data (Chemin 2008).  
The Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc. (MIX), through its MixMarket platform, and the Microcredit 
Summit Campaign are the main source of secondary data and have been critical in collecting large data sets on 
MFIs but both have their own targets and priorities. The MixMarket collects a wide array of financial and 
institutional data, supplemented by a limited amount of social data. The MIX also prepares the Microbanking 
Bulletin which involves data collection on a subset of institutions. These statistics are then adjusted to improve 
comparability and reveal implicit subsidies. Microcredit Summit Campaign on the other hand collects a limited 
number of indicators, most of them related to social outreach, though the number of MFIs reporting is higher 
relative to the MIX. The MIX is skewed towards financial data, while Microcredit Summit Campaign lays more 
emphasis on social and economic change. The strength of the Microcredit Summit Campaign dataset is the 
number of MFIs reporting to it and the diversity of these MFIs. The Summit collects data on many small 
institutions and a few very large ones, whereas the MIX database includes a set of medium to large MFIs. 
Although MixMarket and Microcredit Summit Campaign are geared towards global coverage and 
encourage broad submission of data, MFIs appearing in the two data sets differ systematically by geographic 
location and by their focus on poverty and financial performance. Different statistics are therefore obtained when 
asking the same questions on the same variables. The extent of this data inconsistency was documented by 
Bauchet and Morduch, (2010) who found positive relationship between financial performance and reaching more 
women customers in MIX data set, but a negative relationship using Microcredit Summit Campaign data set.  
MixMarket data has limitations. For instance, it could not allow Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007) 
to answer the controversial question on whether subsidies in microfinance are justified. Answering the question 
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would have required reliable data on social impacts but which was not forthcoming. Data is heterogeneous 
across MFIs and countries. Survey is undertaken using different methodologies, in different geographical zones, 
prevailing economic circumstances, different legal and regulatory framework e.g on interest rates cap and 
incomplete entries. There is therefore a justification on the need to standardize the available data prior to making 
meaningful analysis.   
Since reporting to any microfinance database is voluntary, analyses based on these data are vulnerable to 
self-selection bias. Using a quasi-experimental technique on a panel data, Tedeschi, (2008) shows that self-
selection into the lending program is a significant problem in the data. MFIs reporting to any source are likely to 
be different from those not reporting at all. This bias is likely to be large in magnitude, though it is difficult to 
measure and overcome. Additionally, MFIs self-select into reporting to either the MixMarket or Microcredit 
Summit Campaign or both. Consequently, MFIs reporting to one outlet might differ from those reporting to 
another, or from MFIs reporting to more than one outlet. MFIs may also choose to report some indicators and 
conceal others, and for some years discretionary.  
While participation in firm and household level surveys is in most cases voluntary, some choose to skip 
questions entirely. This pattern of voluntary participation and of discretionary response to and skipping questions 
is not random. Additionally, high-income households are very difficult for researchers to engage. Developing 
countries tend to have less-developed statistical systems and irregular surveys and therefore samples, whether at 
the individual or macro level are seldom full representation of the underlying populations (Bauchet and Morduch, 
2010).  
Several studies such as Ahlin and Townsend (2007b), Gugerty (2007), have utilized survey data. This 
includes collecting information on borrowers before and after program participation. No statistical analyses of 
the differences are conducted and their data did not allow them to control for the possibility of endogenous 
program placement. Changes in the household survey response rates over time as incomes rise and frequent 
changes in the design of household survey within the same country make inference based on the within a specific 
country less reliable compared to inference that relies on within-MFIs. Hence, while the survey data could be 
used for measuring the impacts of microfinance on poverty among other variables, it has not been adequate for 
testing concrete theoretical propositions.  
Recall data is often used in the absence of a baseline survey since it can control for both non-random 
participation and non-random program placement. However, it is also subject to potential biases due to time 
varying unobservables. Differencing noisy data such as that used by Mosley (2001) can exacerbate measurement 
error. Noisy recall data may bias downward coefficients which captures program impacts (Armendáriz and 
Morduch 2010).  
MFIs that are rated have a common interest in accessing funding and increasing their sustainability. The 
leading rating agencies in the microfinance industry include Microrate, Microfinanza, Planet, Crisil, M-CRIL, 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor. The rating reports are narratives consisting of contextual and MFI-specific 
information including accounting details, organizational features and benchmarks. Annual rating reports have 
featured in microfinance research (see e.g Mathews et al 2007) but due to poor book-keeping by MFIs, the data 
is often incomplete, unreliable and not repeated across samples. The reports are not fully standardized and 
therefore differ in their emphasis and in the amount of information available. For example, in Grameen Bank all 
accounting definitions are not standard e.g the reported overdue rates are calculated as the value of the loans 
overdue, greater than one year, divided by the current portfolio. The problem is that the current portfolio tends to 
be much higher than the portfolio that existed when the overdue loans were first made. Reported profits do not 
conform to international accounting standards. Grants from donors are considered part of the income in the profit 
calculation.  
Experimental data have recently become popular. Every empirical researcher who assumes that an 
exogenous variable varies independently of an error term views their data as being generated from an experiment. 
In some cases this belief is a matter of a priori judgment; in other cases it is based on auxiliary evidence and 
inference; while in others it is built into the design of the data collection process (Glenn et al, 2004). That 
notwithstanding, the question still abounds-does this solve data problems? Does the experimental data match 
simulation data well or rather do human agents behave identically? Do the behavioural differences appear to be 
large enough to affect the outcome of the experiment? Qualitative Impact Protocol (QUIP) is one such effort that 
develops guidelines on data collection and analysis but does not resolve quantitative data issues. 
  
8. Conclusion 
This paper reviews methodological and data hurdles in microfinance impact evaluations and the reasons why 
more rigorous studies are necessary. As MFIs innovate in products and programs at a rapid pace, it’s important 
for policymakers and practitioners to understand the relative impact of different mechanisms, particularly on the 
borrowers. The study has observed that cross sectional methodology does not measure the impact of a 
microcredit program satisfactorily. This reflects the difficulty of distinguishing the causal effect of microcredit 
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from selection effects.  
RCTs literature has made great strides towards improving the credibility of empirical work. But they have 
limits: they are not always feasible, not always representative, and not always focused on the larger questions of 
interest. Moreover, there have been limited large-scale randomized trials with the potential to examine what 
happens when microfinance becomes available in a new market. It would be regrettable if randomized trials led 
researchers to avoid questions that cannot be answered through randomized or natural experiments. Quasi-
experimental methods are not always available, panel data is time consuming and expensive for most MFIs, 
while experimental methods sometimes are not feasible and requires expertise which is not available to the MFIs. 
This leaves the problem of loan fungibility unresolved. The issue of fungibility is more important than the issues 
of selection bias and endogeneity in the accurate assessment of impact of microfinance.  
As long as the issue of endogeneity is recognized, it can be resolved through application of appropriate 
econometric techniques. Disaggregated analysis by access to different sources of credit like households with 
micro-credit and formal bank credit only, households with micro-credit and informal credit only and households 
with access to all sources of credit may enable a researcher to derive policy implication of microfinance quite 
clearly. Both descriptive and case studies as well as econometric approaches can be applied in such a situation. 
Such studies can inform the debate on microfinance by sharpening the practitioners’ understanding of the role of 
microfinance in reaching the poor, its impact in different environments, and its cost-effectiveness as a poverty 
intervention. 
Considering credit as endogenous, predicted value of credit along with instrumental variables can be used in 
the function of welfare outcomes. Moreover, household economic portfolio approach may also be applied to 
control for fungibility. Estimates of parameters are sensitive to changes in the sample as well as to changes in the 
model specification. Much evidence has accumulated about the sensitivity of results to changes in model 
specification or data. Thus, for some research problems, the question remains, can useful estimates of structural 
parameters be obtained from observational data?  
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